Abhay Pancharathi
Game 1 of the NBA Finals ended in a Boston blowout, finishing the game up 18 points. The game never felt in doubt except for a brief stretch in the third quarter, where Luka Doncic’s heroics resulted in a 21-point halftime lead being cut to 8. However, Boston rebounded with a 14-0 run to get the game back to a 22-point game and never looked back. This game was a strategic chess match between Jason Kidd and Joe Mazzulla, with Mazzulla having the upper hand. But that begs the question, what did Mazzula, and the Celtics as a whole, do to embarrass the Mavericks?
Tatum on Centers
The first change head coach Joe Mazzulla made was putting forward Jayson Tatum on whichever Dallas Center was in the game, and Center Al Horford on Dallas Forward Derrick Jones Jr. This meant that whenever Luka Doncic wanted to attack Al Horford in space, as Indiana previously had success doing, the smaller Jones was his pick-and-roll partner. While Jones is plenty athletic himself, he is at least 6 inches shorter than both Dallas Centers making him far less dangerous as a lob threat. This forced Jones to “pop” to the three-point line instead of “rolling” into the paint, and while DJJ has become an incredible corner three-point specialist this postseason, he is shooting a far inferior 29% on non-corner threes. Because of this, Doncic has to attack Horford in isolation but since he is not the same mold of quick guards such as Indiana’s Andrew Nembhard or Philadelphia’s Tyrese Maxey, he’s unable to generate as much space on stepbacks. In fact, Horford’s 7’1 wingspan makes him a favorable matchup on Luka for Boston due to his massive contest radius. Gafford and Lively are both non-factors on post-ups, so Boston can get away with this strategy for as long as Dallas cannot get Tatum off their Centers, especially because Tatum is a capable rebounder himself.
Different Strategies for Different Guards
The emphasis on taking away Luka’s playmaking and daring him to take on the entire team 1v5 was reminiscent of another gifted playmaker on a heliocentric offense, James Harden. In the 2018 Western Conference Finals, the Warriors were content to let Harden attack iso situations, rarely sending double teams as long as Harden could not leverage his playmaking. The Celtics employed a similar strategy against Doncic, letting him attack one-on-one on Celtics defenders, refusing to send help even if Luka had beat his man. Luka could score 30 on efficient enough shooting, but he could not get his teammates involved.
While Boston played Luka one-on-one because of his incredible playmaking, they sent endless double teams at Dallas’ other guard, Kyrie Irving. Irving, a born scorer, was unable to punish Boston’s doubles since he doesn’t have the same playmaking feel that Doncic has. It resulted in a rough shooting night, as Kyrie went 6/19 in the game and 3/10 in the pivotal third quarter when Dallas cut the lead to 8. Irving will inevitably shoot better throughout the series, as he did miss quite a few open looks as Head Coach Jason Kidd said, but he will be forced to work for these shots.
Corner Threes
As predicted before the series, the key for the Mavericks would be the corner three. Wings PJ Washington and Derrick Jones Jr. have thrived from the corner these playoffs, but above the break are shooting 28% and 29% respectively, shots that the Celtics will gladly concede. When looking at both the March 1st matchup and Game 1, a familiar trend arises, the lack of corner three attempts.
This is devastating for a Dallas Mavericks offense that has relied on this shot, taking by far the most corner 3s per game these playoffs of any team. The Celtics seemed stubbornly insistent on keeping defenders home on these shots, giving up closeouts as long as the Mavericks couldn’t shoot the threes. Dallas shot 7/27 on threes overall, and 6/24 on non-corner threes. This year, the Celtics are 61-5 when making more threes than their opponent, a 76-game win-pace. If the Mavericks cannot generate corner threes, either off off-ball screens or another way, this series will be over quickly.
Things to keep an eye on for Game 2
How will Boston continue to attack Luka Doncic on defense?
What will Dallas do to generate more corner 3s?
Will Dallas be able to get Porzingis in the Pick-and-roll more?
Will Dallas continue to dare Tatum to pass or will they play him one-on-one?
Is Kyrie's efficiency due to shooting variance or the Boston defense?
How will Porzingis hold up after extended minutes?
Will Dallas be able to avoid post mismatches against Porzingis?
コメント